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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Glenn Morris appeals from the judgment entered upon 
verdict finding him guilty of possession of marijuana. On appeal, Morris 
challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The district court made the following factual findings, which are relevant to 
the traffic stop that resulted in the criminal charge against Morris: 
Sometime after midnight on August 1, 2012, Richard Morris 
and his passenger, Chrystal Phillips, drove away from a well-known 
drug house. Officer Cromwell was driving three to four car lengths 
behind Morris when he observed Morris' two right tires entirely 
cross a white line to the right for a few seconds. It is unknown 
whether the line demarcated a bike path to the right or parking to 
the right. In either event, the line marked the right boundary of 
Morris' lane of travel. Morris was not attempting to avoid obstacles 
in his lane of travel when he drifted to the right. 
Based upon his observation, Officer Cromwell initiated a 
traffic stop on the car Morris was driving. Officer Cromwell 
informed dispatch at 1 :37:47 a.m. that he was initiating the traffic 
stop. Five seconds later, at 1 :37:52 a.m., Officer Cromwell called 
for a canine officer to assist him with the traffic stop. Morris pulled 
over on Overland, just to the east of Latah Street. 
When Officer Cromwell approached the vehicle Morris was 
driving, Officer Cromwell immediately smelled raw marijuana, which 
he is trained to detect. Officer Cromwell called probation and 
parole after learning from defendant Morris that he was on felony 
probation. Officer Cromwell spoke with probation officer Stacy 
Lockner. Officer Cromwell told probation officer Lockner that 
Morris' car had just left a known drug house. 
The canine officer, Officer Plaisted, arrived with his dog Turk 
at 1 :42: 15 a.m. Turk is certified to alert on various controlled 
substances, including marijuana, and he alerted on the car Morris 
was driving. Approximately ½ pound of marijuana was 
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subsequently found in a on the passenger's 
had been 
11 1 
The state charged Morris with possession marijuana intent to 
deliver. (R., pp.7-8, 38-39.) Morris filed a motion to suppress claiming the traffic 
stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause because, he 
argued, he was not straddling the fog line and, even if he was, "such action falls 
within a broad range of normal driving behavior" that cannot be the basis for a 
traffic stop. (R., pp.54-55, 57.) The court conducted an evidentiary hearing after 
which it denied Morris's motion. (R., pp 112-119.) 
Following trial, the jury found Morris guilty of the included offense of 
possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.189.) The court imposed one year 
in county jail with 128 days suspended and 237 days credit for time served. (R., 




Denying Richard [ 
Suppress? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.2 (capitalization original).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Because the traffic stop was based on a violation of the Idaho Code and 
because the district court's decision is supported by substantial evidence, has 
Morris failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Morris Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
Introduction 
Morris challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing 
suppression was required because there was no legal basis for the traffic stop. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) The district court correctly rejected Morris's argument 
and found there was reasonable articuable suspicion to support the stop based 
on Morris's traffic infraction. 
Morris also "disagrees with the court's determination that there was 
substantial evidence upon which Officer Cromwell could be deemed a credible 
witness." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Because this Court defers to the trial court's 
credibility determinations and because there was substantial evidence to support 
the district court's conclusion that Officer Cromwell was credible regarding 
Morris's driving pattern, Morris's "disagreement" with the court's credibility 
determination does not support his request for relief. 
Morris has failed to show error in the denial of his suppression motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). The credibility of the 




are solely within the province district 
Peterson v. State, 1 73 P. 108, 110 (Ct. 2003). 
Morris Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression 
Motion 
Morris challenges the district court's order denying his motion to suppress 
on two bases: (1) the district court erred in concluding Morris's driving behavior 
violated the law; and (2) the district court's credibility determination is 
unsupported by "substantial evidence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.3-7.) Both of 
Morris's arguments fail. 
The district court found that regardless of "whether Morris crossed a line 
demarcating a bike path or a parking area - both types of crossings would 
constitute reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred under I.C. § 49-
630 or I.C. § 49-637." (R., p.117.) This conclusion is correct. 
The plain language of I.C. § 49-637(1) requires drivers travelling on 
highways divided into two or more clearly marked traffic lanes to drive their 
vehicles "as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." For purposes of 
I.C. § 49-637(1 ), the word "lane" means "that portion of the roadway for 
movement of a single line of vehicles." I.C. § 49-121(4). Similarly, I.C. § 49-630 
requires motorists to drive "upon the right half of the roadway" where the highway 
is of sufficient width. A "roadway" is defined as "that portion of a highway 
improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of sidewalks, 
shoulders, berms and rights-of-way." I.C. § 49-119(19). By crossing over the 
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line, Morris left his authorized lane of travel and committed a traffic infraction. 
failed to show otherwise. 
Morris alternatively argues that single and slight deviation from the lane 
of travel falls within the normal range of driving behavior" and, therefore, there 
was no basis for a traffic stop. (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Morris's reliance on State 
v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 809 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991 ), to support this assertion 
is misplaced. 
In Emory, an officer conducted a traffic stop shortly after he observed the 
defendant "fail[] to move for five to six seconds" after the light turned green. 119 
Idaho at 662, 809 P.2d at 523. The officer did so even though he followed 
Emory after this initial observation and watched him "proceed[] correctly through 
another green light" and drive straight but close to a long line of parked vehicles 
on the side of the road. kL Upon making contact with Emory, the officer asked if 
he had been drinking and ultimately arrested Emory for driving under the 
influence. Id. Emory filed a motion to suppress, arguing the traffic stop was 
unsupported by reasonable articulable suspicion. kL The Court of Appeals 
agreed, concluding Emory's actions "could just as easily be explained as conduct 
falling within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving 
behavior." kl, 119 Idaho at 664, 809 P.2d at 525. 
Morris's reliance on Emory appears to be based on the mistaken belief 
that the Court in Emory created a "normal driving behavior" exception to 
violations of Idaho law that regulate driving. It did not. Indeed, nowhere in the 
opinion does the Court discuss any statute, much less the statutes the district 
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found Morris . If anything, precedent supports the district 
in case. 
The relied on State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 
P.3d 685 (Ct. App. 2001), in determining that the traffic stop was lawful. (R., 
p.117.) In Slater, an officer "observed the two right side tires of Slater's vehicle 
cross the fog line on the side of the highway on-ramp as that vehicle entered the 
highway." 136 Idaho at 296, 32 P.3d at 688. The officer "followed Slater's 
vehicle for several miles" and observed Slater travelling at varying speeds before 
initiating a traffic stop. kl, 136 Idaho at 297, 32 P.3d at 689. Slater moved to 
suppress the methamphetamine and other evidence that was discovered as a 
result of the traffic stop, claiming the officer "had no lawful authority to conduct 
the traffic stop." kl The district court and the Court of Appeals rejected Slater's 
claim. kl, 136 Idaho at 297-98, 32 P.3d at 689-690. The Court stated: 
Idaho Code § 49-630(1) requires that a vehicle be driven on 
the right half of the roadway, except in certain circumstances that 
are not applicable in this case. The "roadway" means that portion 
of a highway that is "improved, designed or ordinarily used for 
vehicular travel." I.C. § 49-119(18). It does not include "sidewalks, 
shoulders, berms [or] rights-of-way." Id. Accordingly, when Officer 
Burns observed Slater's tires cross the fog line, albeit fleetingly, 
Burns now possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion that 
Slater had violated I.C. § 49-630 by driving on the shoulder of the 
highway, rather than on the "roadway." See State v. Dewbre, 133 
Idaho 663, 665-67, 991 P.2d 388, 390-92 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Furthermore, Officer Burns observed Slater proceed down the 
highway at varying speeds between 10 and 35 miles per hour 
under the 75 mile per hour speed limit. Based upon Slater's erratic 
speed and crossing the fog line, Officer Burns had reasonable 
suspicion that Slater might also be driving under the i-nfluence of 
alcohol and or drugs, I.C. § 18-8004, or was otherwise impaired. 
Consequently, Slater's motion to suppress based upon alleged 
unlawfulness of the traffic stop was correctly denied. 
7 
Slater, 136 Idaho 298, 3d at 690 (alteration original, footnote omitted). 
Cromwell had reasonable articulable 
C. § 49-630. Morris's efforts to distinguish Slater 
by advancing an unexplained distinction between a bike lane and a shoulder1 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5), is unpersuasive and inconsistent with the plain language 
of the relevant statutory provisions. Further, although the Court in Slater also 
discussed Slater's varying speeds, it did so in the context of finding reasonable 
articulable suspicion of the separate offense of driving under the influence, which 
is distinct from whether there was reasonable articulable suspicion that Slater 
violated I.C. § 49-630. Morris's claim that his allegedly "normal driving behavior" 
prevented the district court from finding a lawful basis for the traffic stop fails. 
Slater next "argues there is not substantial evidence to support the district 
court's conclusion" that Officer Cromwell's testimony regarding the traffic 
violation was credible. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) It is well-established that "[t]he 
district court is the arbiter of conflicting evidence; its determination of the weight, 
credibility, inferences, and implications thereof will not be supplanted by this 
Court's impressions or conclusions from the written record." State v. Howard, 
155 Idaho 666, 673, 315 P.3d 854, 861 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Johannsen v. 
Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 432, 196 P.3d 341, 350 (2008)). Morris's argument 
that the district court's specific credibility finding with respect to Officer 
1 There is no factual finding by the district court that the line at issue designated 
a bike lane. The district court's finding on this point was that it is "unknown 
whether the line demarcated a bike path to the right or parking to the right." (R., 
p.115.) Thus, any argument premised upon a finding that the line Morris crossed 
was a bike lane line is unsupported by the district court's decision. 
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Cromwell's testimony about Morris's driving is not entitled to the usual deference 
appears to be based on the fact that the district court found Officer Cromwell's 
memory "flawed" in other respects. (Appellant's Brief, p.6; R., p.6.) The district 
court described the "flaws" it perceived in Officer Cromwell's memory as follows: 
Officer Cromwell's testimony at the suppression hearing was 
problematic, to say the least. There are two areas, in particular, 
where Officer Cromwell's testimony was demonstrably inaccurate. 
First, Officer Cromwell testified that when he first saw Morris, they 
were both driving down the road. Officer Cromwell stated that he 
followed Morris only because they both happened to be going the 
same direction. Officer Cromwell denied that he was following 
Morris because Morris had recently left a well-known drug house. 
Officer Cromwell denied even seeing Morris leave a well-known 
drug house. The problem with this testimony is that, on August 1, 
2012, right after he stopped Morris, Officer Cromwell told probation 
officer Lockner that he stopped Morris after Morris left a known 
drug house. This fact is irreconcilable with Officer Cromwell's 
testimony to the contrary. 
Second, Officer Cromwell testified at the suppression 
hearing that he called for a canine only after he detected an odor of 
marijuana coming from Morris' car. The "CAD report" shows the 
opposite; namely, that Officer Cromwell called for a canine before 
he approached the car Morris was driving, not after. To be clear, 
the problem with Officer Cromwell's testimony is not that he called 
for a drug dog before he approached Morris' vehicle. That is fine. 
The problem with Officer Cromwell's testimony is that it is factually 
inaccurate. 
(R., pp.117-118.) 
Despite its concerns about some aspects of Officer Cromwell's testimony, 
the court nevertheless found Officer Cromwell was "credible" on the issue of 
"whether Morris' car drifted over a white line on the roadway." (R., p.118.) The 
district court cited three reasons for its credibility determination: 
(1) its own observation of Officer Cromwell's demeanor when 
testifying; (2) Officer Cromwell's truthful testimony that he followed 
Morris for ½ to ¾ of a mile, looking for additional traffic violations 
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against Morris 
Cromwell told Morris at 
crossing a 
, p.118 original).) 
none; and (3) the fact that Officer 
of the stop that he pulled him over 
Morris cites no authority for the proposition that a district court cannot find 
a witness credible on one point but not other points or that a finding that a 
witness is not credible on one or more issues means there is not "substantial 
evidence" to support a finding of credibility on any issue. To the contrary, a 
witness can be found credible even if there are inconsistencies in the witness' 
testimony. See State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 124-125, 127-128, 233 P.3d 52, 
55-56, 58-59 (2010) (noting detective's conflicting testimony but applying 
principle that "[t]he trial judge is in a far better position . . . to weigh the 
demeanor, credibility and testimony of witnesses"). 
Even if this Court were in a position to review the credibility of Officer 
Cromwell, there is substantial evidence to find that Officer Cromwell was credible 
in all aspects of his testimony, even those areas about which the district court 
expressed concern. Officer Cromwell testified that he did not think he told the 
on-call probation officer that he saw Morris leaving a "known drug house" 
because Officer Cromwell "didn't see him leave a known drug house." (Tr., p.36, 
Ls.20-24.) Officer Cromwell said "[t]here is a known drug area" but he did not 
"recall if that's what [he] said or not." (Tr., p.36, L.20 - p.37, L.B.) 
Stacie Lockner, the probation officer who was on-call when the traffic stop 
occurred, testified that Officer Cromwell reported that Morris "was coming from a 
known drug house or drug area" and she did not "know why he made the initial 
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traffic stop." (Tr., p.63, Ls.2-10.) Counsel for Morris then asked: "your notes 
say, 'Stopped by Officer Cromwell after leaving a known drug house'; is that 
correct?" (Tr., p.63, Ls.11-13.) Probation Officer Lockner answered, "Yes." (Tr., 
p.63, Ls.11-14.) 
Officer Cromwell's testimony is not "demonstrably inaccurate" just 
because Probation Officer Lockner's notes reflect that Morris was stopped by 
Officer Cromwell after leaving a known drug house. Officer Cromwell's testimony 
was that he did not recall whether he told Probation Officer Lockner that Morris 
was in a known drug area. That Probation Officer Lockner could recall does not 
make Officer Cromwell's testimony "demonstrably inaccurate." Further, 
Probation Officer Lockner's testimony was that Officer Cromwell said Morris "was 
coming from a known drug house or drug area." (Tr., p.63, Ls.8-9 (emphasis 
added).) That the note reflects "drug house" as opposed to "drug area" also 
does not demonstrate an inaccuracy in Officer Cromwell's testimony. Even if 
Officer Cromwell's testimony and Probation Officer Lockner's testimony could not 
be reconciled, and the district court found one more credible than the other, this 
does not make Officer Cromwell's inability to remember or his testimony 
"demonstrably inaccurate." 
With respect to Officer Cromwell's memory about the timing of his request 
for a canine, he testified that he made the request as he was walking up to 
Morris's car and could smell marijuana. (Tr., p.43, Ls.2-7; see also p.24, L.9 -
p.25, L.10.) After reviewing the "CAD report," which was not admitted into 
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evidence at the suppression hearing2 , Officer Cromwell testified that the stop 
occurred at 1.37 a.m. and 
1 , p.29, L.17 -
Marshall Plaisted, the canine handler, arrived 
L.10, p.43, Ls.8-13.) Officer Plaisted later 
testified that, according to the CAD report, the traffic stop "was entered" at 
1:37:47 and the request for a canine was at 1 :37:52. (Tr., p.55, L.22 - p.56, 
L.1.) The state fails to appreciate the "factual[] inaccura[cy]" cited by the district 
court as it relates to Officer Cromwell's testimony and the CAD report. Based on 
Officer Plaisted's reading of the CAD report, Officer Cromwell requested the 
canine five seconds after the traffic stop "was entered." There is no readily 
apparent inconsistency between the testimony about what the CAD report 
showed and Officer Cromwell's testimony that he requested a canine as he was 
"walking up to the car and smelling the marijuana," which could have been five 
seconds after the stop "was entered."3 
Because there was reasonable articulable suspicion that Morris violated 
the law by crossing over the white line, thereby failing to maintain his lane, and 
because the district court's finding that Officer Cromwell was credible on this 
2 It appears the report was, however, admitted at trial. (Ex. 1, admitted 4-22-13; 
Register of Actions, entry dated 4/22/2013 ("Jury Trial Started").) 
3 Morris may have been attempting to develop some inconsistency when he 
asked Officer Plaisted when officers "typically" contact dispatch in relation to a 
traffic stop and Officer Plaisted answered, the "typical" standard followed by 
officers is to "advise dispatch first and then turn on your lights and pull the car 
over." (Tr., p.55, Ls.10-21.) However, Morris never asked Officer Cromwell 
when he contacted dispatch in this particular case. Compare Munoz, 149 Idaho 
at 128, 233 P.3d at 59 (noting that during the suppression hearing, the detective 
was not asked to explain his conflicting testimony). 
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point is supported by evidence and entitled to deference, Morris has failed to 
establish any error in the district court's decision denying his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment and the 
district court's order denying Morris's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 18th day of September~014. 
uLL--
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